FIP-82: Governance Enhancements

[joey]

@cozeno

1. Criteria and circumstances, and timeline of the Nope DAO. Since the Nope DAO can only veto operations by Tribal Council or individual Pods, those bodies would most likely have a faster turn around time compared to FIP proposals. It seems to me that the Nope DAO would need its own set of abbreviated guidelines (ie skip forum posting, mechanism to respond to Pod action etc) to be able to exercise any meaningful checks on the power of Pods/TC. This brings into focus another issue as experienced by the operation of the OA:

The Nope DAO is a fully on-chain mechanism and given its limited scope, should be able to propose immediately and provide a discussion on the forum to explain rationale simultaneously.

2. Each individual Pod should have their powers as clearly defined as possible and have their own operational guidelines upon formation. In conjunction with Nope DAO, they should be structured to allow for enough time and access to information for the wider DAO to have a realistic chance of overseeing. I feel an easy to understand synopsis of every multisig action is a baseline. Some meaningful discussions on that front has already been forwarded and could provide a model for the prospective Pods.

Yes I think the OA reform proposal should be included as part of these discussions, and pods should follow a similar structure.

3. The process with which new Pods can be incorporated should be outlined.

Pods should be formed through either the DAO following the DAO’s process or the Tribal Council following the Tribal Council’s process, and be sure to comply with guidelines for pod operations per 2.

4. The Guardian Multisig seems to occupy much of the same role as Nope DAO. Current members of the Guardian have more than enough votes (in any combination of 3/7) to exercise the same veto powers via the Nope DAO. As Joey has mentioned, any prospective members of the Guardian should be full time DAO members and ideally have a major stake in the protocol. Working in conjunction with delegated votes, any potential combination of 3/7 Guardian members should conceivably have enough vote to exercise Veto via Nope DAO.

The nope DAO is a crucial alternative to the Guardian, however both are necessary in my opinion for the following reason:

1. Nope DAO has a lower quorum with immediate execution, and is fully permissionless and public. This means 10M TRIBE would equal a global veto on the entire Tribe DAO, which is undesirable. The Nope DAO will not have veto power over the Tribe DAO, only councils and pods.
2. For a similar reason, the Guardian will be the sole maintainer of pausability and security related powers. These powers should not be exposed in a totally public manner.

Crucially, as part of this proposal the Guardian should transition to a Pod structure where the DAO can manage its constituents.