FIP-21: Optimistic Approval
Status: Last Call
- Proposing to use “Optimistic Approval” for TribalChief incentives
- Allows a multisig to adjust incentives, with the charter to enact the results of snapshot votes
- Multisig will be 2 of 4, containing 3 members from the community and 1 from Fei Labs
- The DAO or Guardian can veto during a 4 day timelock window
- Optimistic Approval can be used in the future to create more specialized committees with more flexible decision making frameworks.
We’ve gathered data and community feedback on the DAO governance process and would like to propose modifications designed to streamline DAO governance of Fei Protocol and drive more meaningful engagement. .
The current governance process requires both a snapshot and on-chain vote of approximately the same proposal. Snapshot has historically the best turnout and most accessibility because it is:
- Includes staked TRIBE
Although it may feel somewhat redundant to engage in both votes, it is absolutely critical to maintain ultimate DAO control over PCV to prevent any one party from controlling the protocol. This is especially true of high security actions like changing roles or minting new FEI.
However, certain DAO actions are routine and not core to the mechanism design of the protocol such as adjusting certain protocol parameters and updating incentives in the upcoming TribalChief upgrade.
Consensus on this class of actions can be achieved with consistency and with the required transparency solely by snapshot or by specialized community-led committees. Decentralization is maintained if the broader community retains the ability to veto any in-flight action they do not approve of. This would help to reduce voting fatigue and increase the speed of execution by allowing more specialized segments of the community to flesh out and parameterize proposals before processing through Optimistic Approval.
We are proposing a new governance flow for these non-core and less-critical actions, “Optimistic Approval.” This would allow these actions to be executed by a multisig-gated by a Timelock, with the key caveat that both the DAO and the Guardian can veto these actions during the Timelock window if the admins misbehave or propose something not in favor by the broader community. This concept was first introduced by GyroStable, a yet to launch stablecoin project using a similar PCV model.
In particular, the Fei DAO can pilot this governance flow with the upcoming TribalChief change. The admins of the Optimistic Approval would be able to deploy new incentives programs and update existing ones without going through the DAO. Initially, the admins of the optimistic multisig should only propose incentives changes authorized by snapshot. Eventually, implementations of Optimistic Approval can grant more autonomy to the various admin groups that can be specialized. We also aim to make it easy for any community member to initiate a DAO vote to veto any optimistic proposal down the road.
The multisig for optimistic approval should be distinct from the Guardian, and contain mostly members from the community.
Optimistic Approval will help streamline governance and provide an opportunity for dedicated community members to take an elevated role in governance.
Create a multisig that is able to modify parameters on the Tribal Chief incentive manager. In particular, the multisig will have the ability to call the following functionality:
- Incentivize new pools
- Update emissions rate for existing incentivized pools
- Lower (but not raise) global TRIBE emission rate for TribalChief
- Lock or unlock pools with a capital lockup
Snapshot will be used to signal DAO approval for each incentive decision. Again, these would be subject to veto by governance or the Guardian in case of misbehavior.
Holders of this multisig will be determined as follows:
1 team member from Fei Labs will be on the multisig, determined by Fei Labs
Community members who would like to be included in the multisig should express their intent and lobby for themselves in this thread. 3 of the community members would be elected by approval snapshot vote.
Members of the multisig will be eligible for a recurring monthly 1000 TRIBE grant
- Expectations: they should be active in the community, stay up to date on developments, and sign on relevant proposals. Inactivity will be grounds for removal from the multisig
The multisig will require 2 of 4 signatures to make changes, and will manage its own constituency.
After 3 months, the community can vote to renew the Optimistic approval and determine new members and additional scope for the program if widely accepted.
Scope of Permissions
Each optimistic approval multisig will have a very narrowly defined set of permissions. In particular, these multisigs will not have the ability to mint or burn FEI, to perform protocol upgrades, or to modify protocol permissions. Even though the permission scope for each multisig will be narrowly defined, unchecked misuse could still result in harm to the protocol. Thus, it will also have a timelock of no less than 24h longer than however long it takes to do a DAO proposal (currently 72 hours), during which the DAO or Guardian can veto an action or revoke Optimistic permissions altogether.
This proposal focuses on piloting the feature on the TribalChief, and additional optimistic multisigs will require a DAO vote.
Please share feedback on the proposed framework and rollout plan for Optimistic Approval!
- I support the Optimistic Approval pilot
- I do not support the Optimistic Approval pilot