FIP-21: Optimistic Approval

This is a great idea, it is high time to bring more power to the DAO.

I would like to put myself up for consideration as well. I’ve joined the community shortly after Genesis and have practically lived on the server ever since. Through my work on Fei Academy, my moderation on Discord and Discourse and as part of many proposals I have proven my engagement and dedication to the community. I have dedicated a large amount of time to this project and I will not stop anytime soon.

For me this approval admin group seems like the next logical step. Furthermore I would like to introduce the idea of representing ideas to both the admin group and the community through my graphics work. We all know that “one picture says more than a thousand words”.

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This is an interesting objective I would support. These four groups seem logical plus one free-floating member from the community.

For this pilot, all proposals should be authorized by a snapshot, lets say for the first month? Then we can re-evaluate adding new powers and more autonomy to these groups if it goes well.

This is a good way to achieve the bandwidth we want while retaining community buy-in and decentralization.

I feel strongly that the multisigs should not be omnipotent, by which I mean printing arbitrary FEI or updating roles, at least for a long time. Any FEI allocations should be scoped to pre-minted FEI, for example.

Also, folks like Robert would be great candidates for the Guardian when we expand its constituency, but not for operational multisigs like this one.


I’m very excited to see so much interest in participating in this pilot and think a lot of you bring valuable experience and have a history of being positive contributors to the protocol.

If all goes well, we can soon add optimistic approval multisigs for things like:

  • FeiRari (sort of a throwback to Fei Lend in spirit)
  • PCV allocations / Light Lending Framework
  • Grants

Some people would be a better fit for certain types of multisigs over others, so I think we should expect some shuffling and more opportunities to get involved for people who don’t end up as part of the pilot.

I also thing we should stress the continued use of Snapshot for authorizing decisions until the model has proven itself out to continue to foster broad engagement on the forum and in the discord.

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I’ve advocated for a similar governance structure some time ago while contemplating the governance of “FEI Lend”, I’m very convinced of the necessity of a standing committee in a large democratic body such as FEI DAO. I welcome this incentive as a very important pilot and precedence for the future of FEI governance.

Aside from ensuring a odd number of members, I believe that the initial authorizing charter should be even more restrictive, and attempt to specify a permission range of parameters. In the case of TribalChief, the charter should define a range for permissible emissions rate, dollar amount of capital allowed to lock/unlock, etc.

I believe the key advantage of an executive standing committee is nimbleness of reaction, not necessarily superior decision making or knowledge or “professionality”. In the case of interest rate incentives and controlling supplied liquidity amounts, sometimes a hourly response to whales taking out massive loans to engage in arbitrage is merited. Therefore instead of enforcing such a long timelock period, I believe it is better to define a narrower range of allowed parameters.

With regards to election of members, I feel like perhaps a rank choice voting amongst candidates would be the most superior format, where voters rank their candidates by preference. Though how technically feasible this is on snapshot i cannot say.

I’ve also translated this thread for discussion on Wechat, and I will update here any insights over there.

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Great to see governance advancing and experimenting, this is an important step for Fei Community!

I would like to apply for the position of a signer.

I’ve joined the community before Genesis and dedicated a lot of energy to the project since that time. Initially, I helped with the onboarding (early days with @DioDionysos and @GrantG) and as the project evolved, I participated in ALL the discussions providing analysis and tools to help community decision-making.

I think time dedicated to the project is one relevant variable that could be considered. Sustaining a high level of engagement for a long period of time is a demonstration of our passion to the project.

I coordinated the formation of the PCV Diversification working group with @Eswak , @countvidal and @Matthew_Graham . In the last 3 months, we delivered PCV guidelines and many proposals, including the staking of ETH that is generating revenue to the protocol. More details here.

I also would like to highlight that I always valued the voting process a lot. I think community engagement is key to the success of the project in the long term. I am one of the most active voters in DAO votes (just behind the founders).

I am here for the long term. I would love to help, bringing my strategic and analytical perspective to the group.

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Happy to see so much interest here. Fei will certainly achieve more when it can leverage more people’s wisdom and talents and labor.

Aside from ensuring a odd number of members, I believe that the initial authorizing charter should be even more restrictive, and attempt to specify a permission range of parameters. In the case of TribalChief, the charter should define a range for permissible emissions rate, dollar amount of capital allowed to lock/unlock, etc.

Restricting the range of values is a very good idea and I think it should be a feature to aim for. For safety, either the timelock restrictions or range restrictions will be necessary for each multisig. Different aspects of the protocol will have their own unique management needs, so each of these restriction types might be optimal for different situations.

For the first cut at this though, the range restrictions will be much more complex to implement code-wise, whereas the timelock restrictions can be implemented with minimal changes to the current codebase.

With regards to election of members, I feel like perhaps a rank choice voting amongst candidates would be the most superior format, where voters rank their candidates by preference. Though how technically feasible this is on snapshot i cannot say.

The voting systems available on snapshot can be seen here Voting systems - snapshot . I think the most natural voting choice type when there are will be multiple winners is either Approval voting or Weighted Voting. I am not sure Ranked choice voting will work in a straightforward way when there will be multiple winners.

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One more thing: I don’t think it’s a good idea to select people for such task based on a quota. It shouldn’t be a reward for some activity. People should be entrusted based on their merit and fit for the job. For example, nobody from the Chinese community except for @cozeno participated in the discussions and most of the mods never even weighed in on technical issues, I even don’t know what their thinking will be, let alone policies. This Soviet-style quota-based elections, when a person is chosen only for belonging to a certain community strata or rewarded for the activity which has nothing to do with the task in question, is not productive at all.

After some reflection I think the initial charter for the Optimistic Approval Pilot should be completely restricted to enacting the results of snapshot votes. This will give us the opportunity to try out the model without any additional burden on the governance process or dependence on the specialization of the signers, as @cozeno mentioned. We also wouldn’t need any quotas as @pavel mentioned.

I also think it should be shortened to 1 month from TribalChief deployment so we can evaluate if we want to add in additional multisigs with more complex charters.

So far @Bruno , @countvidal , @pavel , @DioDionysos and @Meertitan have self signaled a desire to be on the multisig.

Assuming no one else comes forward, we can do a 4 of 6 with myself included along with the 5 above.

Let me know your thoughts on this plan, we can bring it to snapshot on Thursday Aug 12 pending final discussions

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Apologies for not signaling earlier, but I would also like to apply to be on this multisig.

I believe I was the first to point out the potential impact of TribalChief on the market value of TRIBE. After realizing its implications on retail investors, I changed my position and advocated against the proposed reward allocation of the snapshot vote that ended today. I also proposed a reward allocation that can benefit both retail TRIBE holders and the protocol as a whole. As a result of these activities, I believe I am well suited for representing the community’s interests in deciding future rewards allocations.

I have not held an official role in the community, but I have been active since Genesis. I made some contributions to updating the reweight mechanism and I was one of the first in the community to advocate for abolishing Direct Incentives.

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I fully welcome Joey’s comment to restrict the scope of this pilot Optimistic multisig. Though I believe that rapid reaction to market movement is one of the key reasons for the multisig’s existence, therefore I advocate for the charter to at least permit the multisig to manipulate the emissions rate of TRIBE within a predefined range.

Upon further thought, I’ll signal my intention to join this pilot optimistic approval committee; with a focus on observing and contemplating the practice of a standing committee within a larger, decentralized DAO.

I have been an active member of this community since genesis launch, and has since served a key communicative role between the Chinese community and the wider FEI community. I’ve also played a part in conceptualizing the interest rate subsidizing programs of FEI, which is spiritually realized in the form of RARI/Cream etc currently.

I believe that members of this pilot program should make extensive publications of the decision making process, to enable better reflection and public commenting so as to improve the execution of future multisigs.

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I like the spirit of this proposal – a more frictionless method to update parameters of TribalChief without sacrificing community trust. I’d also +1 the idea of restricting (at least in the beginning) the multisig to enacting Snapshot votes. After that pilot, it’d be natural for the multisig to assume more responsibilities. 3 of 5 or 4 of 6 both seem good to me.

It’s truly awesome to see so many people interested in this.

Since the first iteration of OA will be focused on managing TribalChief, let’s wait until there is a version of TribalChief that can pass a snapshot before moving forward with an OA snapshot. A new TribalChief vote is going up soon :sunglasses: :sunglasses:

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Since TribalChief has passed its snapshot vote, it would be good to decide on whether Optimistic Approval should be a means of managing the staking system.

There are 7 people that have self-nominated in this thread. Each one is a trusted community member with a history of active contribution on the discord and the forum.

@Bruno
@countvidal
@cozeno
@DioDionysos
@fei.saver
@Meertitan
@pavel

It is for this reason that in the first iteration of OA we believe that it would be best to use a 4 of 7 multisig that is held by each of the above members. Having 7 people alongside the guardian and DAO veto’ing mechanisms will ensure that the multisig securely carries out its mandate.

It is important to reiterate that OA is NOT a conventional multisig. Its powers are narrowly defined, its mandate is merely to enact snapshot votes on-chain, and all of its actions are gated by a timelock and can be veto’d by the DAO or Guardian before they take effect on-chain.

Please vote and discuss.

https://snapshot.fei.money/#/fei.eth/proposal/QmbqR88Ta6rM2QmmHj75UZSVZhTSawGf5JbgJGuuJQNDeZ

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Also the meme potential here is enormous

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Have you considered using Aragon Govern for optimistic governance? It can be easier to use for this use case and less permissioned compared to multisig, as all Tribe holders will have the ability to challenge proposals.

How modular is it? What are the parameters?

All Tribe holders can challenge these proposals because the multisig will use a custom timelock with veto functionality

You have a transaction builder similar to the one you have in Gnosis Multisig, so you can interact with any smart contract and batch the operations. The key difference is that proposals are passed automatically after some configured timelock unless challenged by a Tribe holder who puts collateral, which is lost if he loses a dispute.

It also has integration with Aragon Voice which is a L2 voting system, similar to Snapshot, so all passed proposals can be automatically posted to Govern.

In a currently suggested protocol (for me) it looks like this:

  1. Snapshot vote passes;
  2. One of 7 creates as multisig transaction and pings the other signers;
  3. Collects 4 signatures;
  4. Executes operation, through some proxy smart contract which will give time to organize cancelation vote in DAO or transaction by Governor.

With Govern it would work like this:

  1. Snapshot vote passes;
  2. One of the whitelisted wallets create a proposal on Govern;
  3. After timelock it’s automatically executed unless challenged by any Tribe holder who puts collateral.

In case Voice is used, 2) can be skipped as well.

P.S. Some core settings example: Aragon Govern - Optimistic Governance for DAOs

who would want to gamble their Tribe for this?

I guess it depends on amount of collateral set to challenge a proposal, but anybody who cares and sure that he’s right as it’s quite easy to validate having an exact criteria e.g. “passed snapshot vote with minimal participation being X”. Tribe can put a bounty for legit challenges if extra motivation is needed.

With respect to using Aragon, we should keep an open mind for the future but I like the idea of simply challenging/vetoing with the DAO itself and the Guardian. Introducing some economics with bonding feels like it needs more thought as our governance/access control model is relatively complex.

I am creating the OA multisig address and getting all of the signer’s addresses. Once it is ready I’ll share in this thread.

The OA multisig address has been set up on Gnosis Safe and all members have been added. This is the contract where all transactions can be retraced.
Also, there was an OA channel added to Discord where all our conversations can be seen but only the OA team members and the core team can post.

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