I’m not sure how you could enforce this requirement.
I was thinking it would come after the holder engaged in governance in some form. Not sure how it would work or if it is feasible. I’m just trying to think how we could make sure tribe is in the hands of people who want to help steward the protocols future.
I think the protocol should follow the Curve model, personally. When you lock up CRV, you get veCRV (which is used for actual voting). The longer you lock for, the higher the reward multiplier you get. I think the protocol should implement this, but maybe add a small multiplier bonus for “diamond hand” pre-swappers that runs for the first year. If you bought any TRIBE in the pre-sale, and didn’t sell any TRIBE since then, you get a linear of this multiplier add-on based on your percentage of preswap. So let’s say we say the bonus is 30% for 100% pre-swappers. For 50% pre-swappers, they’d get 50% of 30%, or 15% bonus, and so on.
This would reward diamond hands, incentivize long-term decision making, and yet would not exclude fractional pre-swappers or folks scooping up TRIBE on the open market right now who want to buy in to bet on the long-term success of the protocol.
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I like both of these ideas. I think any type of TRIBE airdrop should be on a vesting schedule. And regarding distribution to whales, this is also essential, otherwise this could potentially hand over massive amounts of voting power to wallets to abuse.
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I’ll just copy/paste my answer because I think this sentence is largely exaggerating the conclusion you come to, hence makes me doubt the whole reasoning as it is now so easy to reason on risk post-mortem. I bet (my opinion is as good as yours) that plenty of 100% pre-swappers were expecting to have a crazy speculative move (just based on the name of the investors on the project for example…).
There are incentivization baked into the protocol since day one, and those are LP stakers.
So here it is:
I see too much of this division between TRIBE-only and FEI-only , and way too much abuse about the risk taken by some and not by others - we can all appreciate at this point that everyone is taking a risk.
The genesis allowed you to choose the risk you were taking, the way you wanted - that was not all pre-swapped+airdrop vs. all fei+airdrop , it was a scale from 0 to 100% , so that allows a lot of space.
I think those divisions among people who made choices from 0% pre-swapped to 100% pre-swapped is a already factored risk in everyone’s decision at the genesis.
Both extreme of the spectrum have adopted different strategies, and are now fighting each other taking all the space , when clearly both are mostly defending their sel-interest which was a full exposure to the underlying risk of both assets.
One could argue, to be fair (
) that TRIBE “holders” - hmm, we are at day 1 of the protocol but anyway the 100% pre-swap - were clearly betting on the protocol taking instantly a crazy value, FEI holders were thinking of an easy way out with the airdop.
This algorithmic stablecoin, as the genesis event, was not made to favor one over the other but to allow flexibity in genesis investors choices, hence the kind of risk they were the most comfortable with.
The extreme polarization around this 100% pre-swap TRIBE holders starts to intoxicate the debate , as much as the short-term runner, about making the adjustments that a DAO comfortable with diverse coexistent strategies and interests should do .
This project is announced as THE stablecoin for the whole DeFi ecosystem. That means starting by getting over this single use case: making it ““right”” (sigh) to the 100% pre-swappers.
Let’s submit an aidrop with this polarized vision to the next vote, I am all for it, but please don’t make it the crusade for the righteous supporters of the project.
My position is that it is disproportionate, and that the arguments are really just 2 extremes and reverse/a posteriori risk management (not how it works as far as I know) - and as long as everyone is fine with that, let’s move on.
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Would you agree that buying a stablecoion vs buying a speculative token on the very early stage of the project, whose price depends on the overall success of the project, represents different levels of risk?
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that was not all pre-swapped+airdrop vs. all fei+airdrop , it was a scale from 0 to 100% , That’s why I’m suggesting an exponential function, whose parameters can calculated further on, not just a binary function (either 0% or 100%). I wrote about this.
I agree with you it should benefit all holder
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I would agree on different ways to model risk/reward at the genesis. Not on some taking more risk and so, deserving a bigger reward (and I am a pre-swapper, just not 100%). I think the only serious argument regarding the protocol is to propose better incentives to TRIBE holders OVER TIME.
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As I said, I was copy/pasting an answer, this was mostly relevant in the other context and I find your distribution function elegant and coherent with your proposition, but as I said in my 1st point, I disagree with the premises.
I would agree on different ways to model risk/reward at the genesis. Not on some taking more risk and so, deserving a bigger reward
I disagree
Blockquote
In my view it should be done not only to reward those who supported the project throughout this whole debacle, but more importantly, to build up a a healthy governing body consisting of people who proved by action their commitment to Fei.
40% of Tribe are now under DAO Treasury governance. I suggest that these tokens should be distributed among those, who pre-swapped and didn’t sell their share, because where else would you find more loyal believers?
Then agree to disagree :), and it should now be clear that this comes to a mathematical formula based on a completely set of subjective assumptions.
I agree with most of this analysis except for the priority of 100% TRIBE preswap being the most committed. As a long term believer I decided a 50% preswap was best for staking and creating long term protocol liquidity.
You’re denying that a stablecoin is more stable (=less risky) than a volatile (=more risky) governance token. It should now be clear that you’re basing your analysis on a subjective assumption detached from reality.
You’re assuming from a new and experimental mechanism which has for end-goal a stablecoin that it has already reached its goal - which obviously is not the case at this point in time, and that was a possibility on which communication was made pre-gensis. You completely misrepresents the risk taken by every participants and don’t want to assume the risk people have taken by preswapping all or part of their FEI.
At least, I can point to historical data that just proves it to be wrong, and you make your claim once those data are known from everyone - and yes, again, it was a risk advertised by the project’s documentation before genesis.
You conclude " I suggest that these tokens should be distributed among those, who pre-swapped and didn’t sell their share, because where else would you find more loyal believers?"
That’s just not a real thing. “loyal believers” can’t currently seriously be distinguished from others who have different strategies and expectations regarding this project. That takes more than 2 days genesis, and more than 1 week imo.
So, it’s my last comment on the exaggerated claim on which you base your airdrop/compensation fantasy - enjoy your free beers thinking you deserve them. Cheers!
I’m sorry, but that is you who are mixing up different asset classes with different risk levels into an amalgam as if they are all the same, which is not true.
You’re assuming from a new and experimental mechanism which has for end-goal a stablecoin that it has already reached its goal - which obviously is not the case at this point in time, and that was a possibility on which communication was made pre-gensis. You completely misrepresents the risk taken by every participants
True, this whole enterprise is new and risky, which was stipulated by the docs. However, within this risky enterprise there were assets with different risk levels. By combining different asset classes with different risk levels, e.g. USD, treasuries, preferred stocks (akin to stablecoins) and common stocks (akin to governance tokens) in different proportions you get portfolios with different risk profiles. That’s just basic portfolio management.
and don’t want to assume the risk people have taken by preswapping all or part of their FEI.
The suggested formula exactly represents individual risk profile.
At least, I can point to historical data that just proves it to be wrong
Present the data.
That’s just not a real thing. “loyal believers” can’t currently seriously be distinguished from others who have different strategies and expectations regarding this project. That takes more than 2 days genesis, and more than 1 week imo.
The fact that a person didn’t succumb to the overwhelming FUD (just read crypto twitter and discord) and didn’t sell when the core premise of the project just didn’t work, funds were siphoned from the PCV, governance token tanked by 60% within several days is a good first step for a long-term investor (aka loyal believer). Then a vesting period could become a second test.
So, it’s my last comment on the exaggerated claim on which you base your airdrop/compensation fantasy - enjoy your free beers thinking you deserve them. Cheers!
I don’t drink beer. Cheers to you!
No. There are lots of tribe holders are just short-term arbitrager who saw this opportunity and bought low price tribe. Most of them will sell Tribe after the PCV redemption. We should only rewards loyal supporters who preswapped and didn’t sell a single token.
I like this, incentivise for long term
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I like this proposal overall but I believe this section is a bit over generalizing:
There could be some who 50/50 swapped with the intent to hold for the long term and provide liquidity on Uniswap to yield farm the Tribe token. Those 50/50 preswappers are taking a big risk in terms of potential IL, but they are also being loyal to the project. They are also providing liquidity and usage for FEI from day one.
As for the 100% preswappers, they could indeed be loyal and “true-believers”, but some could also just have been mercenary capital swapping 100% to a volatile asset betting that FOMO would send TRIBE multiples higher in the short term.
And of course, there are preswappers who did all sorts of different ratios. I do think it is fair to say that some were hedging risks by not 100% preswapping, but not all. Especially those who put their FEI and TRIBE in Uniswap to provide liquidity.
It’s hard to say what any preswappers motives were when they made the preswap ratio. All we know is that some have held and some have sold. Drawing absolute conclusions on motives for whole swathes of investors based on their preswap percentage is over generalizing and impossible to be accurate as a result.
All that said, I think your suggested distribution function is fine though. I just wanted to point out my disagreement with the conclusions you were drawing based on the preswap percentage.
Thanks for taking the time to write this up, too.
Cheers!
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