I see. It does seem like a significant difference. It seems like by design we always have 100m \geq w(t) (I guess I’ll just have to use aspirational latex. So when m increase, we move further away from a reweight.
I’m not sure that’s entirely undesirable. After all, the further away from the peg, the more expensive the reweight. So it seems prudent to extend it’s hope for direct incentives to come back closer to peg throug direct incentives before triggering a reweight. I’m not sure if this was intentional or not, but it doesn’t seem like an unreasonable decision. That said, you might be right that this is not desirable. I’m not at all sure. And now I do see that your solution addresses the problem of the price of reweights by introducing a delay between the announcement that a reweight will happen and the actual reweight.
What’s led you to be convinced that minting/burning do not play an effective role in supporting the peg? Of course, they weren’t successful in the first couple of days after launch. But they were operating under extreme sell pressure. And the implicit reward of mints (that FEI would eventually be sellable at $1), hadn’t been realized yet. It could be the case that minting/burning do not shine as bootstrapping mechanisms, but do work effectively in the long term.