I believe that the quality of the votes at the moment can be detrimental to the future of the protocol since the absolute majority is not compromised for the long term.
Those who did preswap never had promises of guaranteed earnings, but they are complaining as if it had been promised. On other side, for those who decided not to take the risk of preswapping, they were harmed even though it was promised that they would be on a stablecoin. Unfortunately, those who are frustrated that did not make their instant 2x on the preswap are the ones who vote. I believe that the team should lead the voting as they are one of the only ones committed to the long term of the project.
In fact, the launch was a disaster, but you shouldn’t affect the customers of your product(FEI), unless you want to rekt your entire company(TRIBE).
(I don’t have any FEI or TRIBE) Still waiting a good moment to BUY TRIBE again tho.
Frankly, personally I don’t want to see the people get away without a slap on the hand, but I’m choosing a small one over the continuous negative effect they all have on the system.
And obviously I hear you, I just want the differences between the 3 options to be discussed on the mid-term effect. So, to me, the numbers should make a difference - and burning the equivalent of the air-swap or the equivalent amount of FEI to repay for the airswap already sold actually sounds complicated to implement (but ideally I would have gone this way, and then let them leave ).
If the vote result if no reserve stabilization, FEI will crash and take TRIBE with it. Remember that the protocol currently does not have any mechanism to keep the peg. The direct incentives have zero effect on the peg, and a brand new reweight trigger needs to be designed. The only thing that has been holding up the price is an expectation of a sensible exit option. If this expectation is betrayed, things will be even worse then before. Think about why the team is proposing this vote, when they hold more TRIBE then the biggest of the whales.
Either way (0.9 or 1 or 0.95 which sound more fair INHO) the swap will be against ETH. So will the team consider the latest price of ETH/USD or the one at which people have contributed to the PCV?
I don’t feel comfortable making this too personal and going into details about my own investment reasoning, well at least not more than I already have… I will try to speak more generally as it also is I think more useful for everyone else.
I think that the decision on how much to preswap is not putting people on the spectrum of how much they believe in the project. I think it just measures how risk averse they are. At one end you have a stable coin (well almost ) and on the other a speculative asset. People that didn’t preswap do not like risk as much as those that preswapped at 100%. The risk averse might even call the people that swapped at 100% greedy… In the end everyone gets TRIBE, right? What is wrong with just getting less TRIBE holding it and making a little bit less profit in the wrong run? Why would this not be a legitimate behavior? It’s just different types of investors.
There is a valid concern that if the vote is split between option 1 and 2 then option 3 might win, eventhough the majority may want to support the “auction” proposal.
For example the vote could look like this:
30% option 1(auction $1)
30% option 2(auction $0.90)
40% option 3(no auction)
How would we decide in this situation. Would it be fair to let option 3 win?
Or should there be another vote held with just option 1 and 2, as they collectively garnered 60%?
If the PCV is not used as a tool to balance the supply and demand, the promise of a stablecoin really vaporizes. At 0.9, you take out a significant chunk of the of it, but keep a good chunk of possibly destabilizing supply. The selling and rebasing will continue until this unhealthy supply is gone. Ideally you want holders that are not out to dump, so it seems the only reasonable way out is to take the $1 route.
If nothing is done, and the protocol becomes undercollateralized, the situation becomes extremely ugly. I think this is a risk not worth taking. With high Eth volatility and unhealthy supply in the system, I don’t think a peg can be realistically maintained.
With the unhealthy supply gone, you get a balanced market that can test the real effectiveness of the protocol. Maybe the system needs to change, but you don’t have the stablecoin pegged at zero.
Instead of fighting $1 or $0.9, can you just take the weighted average based on how many voted for those 2 options?
E.g. 50% $1 & 50% $0.9 will result in $0.95
If you really want to I guess you could consider the $0 case, but that’s a bit silly considering the bottom floor price is the current market price on uni.
Another idea could be pricing based on eth price at genesis at eth price at redemption time.
If eth price at redemption time is above genesis, let people claim for $1.
If eth price at redemption time is lower than genesis, let people claim for (current eth price / genesis eth price * $1).
I think the weighted average makes more sense so people stop fighting.
P/s: Obviously I’m disregarding the TRIBE holders here, but since the start TRIBE has always been the long-term gov token, not short-term. I don’t know why short-term TRIBE price keeps getting brought up. There are other ways to make up for it once the protocol stabilises, like the additional airdrop or increased staking rewards Joey mentioned.
everyone knew what risk they were taking, I would vote against everything … let the team set up the protocol and people wait for implementation…
the protocol itself must equalize the price and after that all who do not like something can come out
People could vote for .9. assuming there is a desire for the project to go forward, it’s going to have to bring it back to $1 at some point. bite the bullet now. not everyone is going to sell and even if they did, because so many people got cleared out at .8/.9 (and because eth actually went up), fei will still be over collateralized.
that’s a good situation all things considered. keep in mind that voting for ‘3’ and if eth falls to $1600 (not impossible) while everyone is twiddling their thumbs, the whole project (fei and tribe) is at risk.
If the peg isn’t fixed, airdropped tribe will just be dumped, thus forcing the price back down. As a TRIBE holder, I would rather have the peg fixed, rapid deployment of use cases for FEI and improvement of LP rewards. These would give an opportunity for my TRIBE to apprecaite.
The price of FEI is moving closer to the PEG as people come in to scoop massive amounts of FEI in hopes of getting a redemption to 1.00 out of it. I do not know what is truly “right” here.
Fair enough. I think this is a good perspective. I’m tempted to fully agree with you. The only thing that stops me is that I’m not convinced this decision will really afford us a fresh start. On the one hand, it’s possible to the people that sell their FEI, even at $1, keep creating negative press for the protocol. On the other hand, it’s possible that people that feel like this proposal is unfair to them might be a new source of negative press for the protocol. It’s largely unpredictable. I sure hope that if this passes it gives us a fresh start. And, as much as I’m not in favor of this proposal, after its subjected to a vote I’m committed to not focusing on how it might’ve been unfair to me. The only way after a vote is forward, regardless of what the vote is.
Ironically, your guess is wrong . Some things just go beyond what your personal short term interest is. This decision is, at least for me, one of those things. I’m just trying to figure out what will be the best call here objectively speaking. Would you vote for a proposal to just distribute the PCV to TRIBE holders and end the project? Of course, not I hope There needs to be balance
I agree that these proposals have the virtue of being simple to implement and easy to understand. And I think any proposal that get’s put to a vote is better off for possessing those qualities. I personally don’t think we should amend the exit strategy to correct for the airdrop or to also allow tribe holders to exit. That might introduce new unpredictable ways to game the system. Still, I’ll probably be voting no on this proposal. Not because I want a proposal that is fair to tribe holders. But because I believe in sticking to our guns and making the project work without needing to bail anyone out in the short term. If the project does work, anyone that stays will have an upside that is at least as great as the potential upside of exiting now for $1. If it doesn’t, we all lose. That, to me, is how early participation in experimental DEFI should work.
).
) and on the other a speculative asset. People that didn’t preswap do not like risk as much as those that preswapped at 100%. The risk averse might even call the people that swapped at 100% greedy… In the end everyone gets TRIBE, right? What is wrong with just getting less TRIBE holding it and making a little bit less profit in the wrong run? Why would this not be a legitimate behavior? It’s just different types of investors.