The level of discussion happening here is awesome.
I’m thinking it will be good to see the mechanism play out for some more time and see to what degree staking will change the tune.
We also should let the next automatic reweight play out, which should be over the next few days. If we get to Tuesday without a reweight and buy support on the staking side then evaluating the above options is good.
It is not really possible to pull staking rewards forward. At this point I think waiting until tomorrow will be ok.
I’d be a fan of doing a reweight earlier than Tuesday (72 hrs in defi seems like an eternity) but either way I think this should be communicated more broadly to set some expectations too.
Also a goal for a stablecoin is both keeping the peg and being liquid… Right now even if we can get the peg back in a day we are really killing confidence on the liquidity of fei.
Great to see so many ideas here! 
In my view, the decision should be made considering the perspective of long-term holders of TRIBE and users of FEI.
In my opinion priority now would be to protect the FEI reputation, preserve PCV and bring the peg to $1 with managing expectations.
The options 1) and 3) may not solve the problem as the selling pressure is very very big. In my view, reweights will only favor bots now and will do more damage than benefit. And 2) may not be sufficient if we do not solve selling side. The problem is not on the Buy Reward Rate, but on the Sell Burn Rate and the expectation of reweight.
There is a lot of short term seller pressure. I imagine they would like to sell with a penalty, but not a very high one. The expectation for a reweight is working against the protocol. Sellers do not sell before it, I suppose. And buyers do not buy, because they will have to compete with bots and a lot of sellers in the the reweights and will lose. Maybe reweight alone is not the best mechanism when we have a lot of sell pressure and 4) option is a good way.
I think 4) and 5) are interesting alternatives.
But in 5) investors may still wait for the peg reweight to sell. It would be good to have some data on how FEI was traded according to each Sell Burn Rate, to see if cap could work well?
Option 4) seems to be the best one. It would be similar to a central bank operating in the exchange markets. PCV would offer to FEI holders a way out at 0.95 for example. Why this floor? It would be good to have data here to determine the better floor?
FEI sellers may just do the calculations of how much worth to sell FEI now or wait for a chance in the next reweight. Expectations about ETH price and FEI-TRIBE staking rewards may also play a role. What will be the impact on PCV with a large scale buying in the 0.95 floor? If peg go to $1 seems positive. Technical doubt, how we are going to use the ETH if they are providing liquidity to the pool?
And I agree that we can wait to see how staking rewards will impact the market. FEI is just one year old and is still in the maternity. I think we need to let more ideas to come and gather more data to take a more informed decision.
I WANNA SUGGEST SIMPLE IDEA
PEG to >1.01, so people still get reward over 1.01.
the reason for people selling fei rapidly is that there would be chance for it being higher than what they paid for at genesis.
as the price equilibrium is about ~0.9USD. then PEG up to 1.1USD.
The reserve has way too much ETH so we wont have to worry about too much inflation as long as reserve is enormous and more ETH inflow is very limited.
While the need for a use case for FEI is extremely important to the long term health of the protocol. The most glaring issue is maintaining the peg.
Confidence needs to be built before people will buy and use it, and this can be done by maintaining the peg.
3 ,4 and 5 seem the best approach. The main problem is about how it will draining our reserves.
I think 5 should be implemented, so no one feels “trapped” in the protocol, but with implementation of 3 (if the maths allows us to do this without destorying our PCV).
Once confidence in our peg is restored, some of the DI will help maintain it, and the use cases of FEI can be expanded and integrated. However, as of now, the wider crypto community is pushing a very negative image of FEI, which will just to continue to hurt us, as we try to grow the use-cases of fei.
This looks like a great short term solution. This will help the FEI holders immediately - remove the sell pressure.
It is a bad thing because frequent reweighting creates a deflationary spiral that deflates faster the faster you reweight. Think sustainable answer is adjusting fei hold incentives by utilising PCV rather than more frequent rebasing. Pretty big assumption that this changes behaviour positively in any way. I think more likey to be more negative to behaviour as becomes more profitable short
I agree.
I am more on the side of going all the way and let this to be kind of the battle testing of the protocol mechanism (within a reasonable window and possibly with a floor) in its current settings. Let’s learn our lesson.
Then we’ll have “real” data (based on the initial design and working in the wild crypto-world), and imo only then we can seriously take a decision on ways to tweak those initial settings.
But I understand the risk aversion of most. I just don’t want to see decisions rushed based on such a short time window, ppl expecting instant integrations in the most prominent DeFi projects, and selling pressure (due to short term vision currently, not actually lowering risks imo) being the drivers here.
Now some (many here) raised very good points questioning the protocol settings, but I am more on the side “let see what happens with the current mechanisms”, especially the triggering of the reweight, and then act on it, using all those great ideas that are shared here.
Overall I am learning a lot from everyone here, so, thanks btw!
Making r a linear function of m basically implies constant reweight time. The condition for reweight is w(t) = m * 100 where w(t) = rt (yeah it is a simplification since buying reduces w(t) as well) then if we say r = r0m we get the condition to be:
r0mt = m100 or r0t = 100 so the time to the reweight will not be a function of m anymore but will instead just be t = 100/r0 so it will happen with a static frequency.
We need 1 asap and 3 is the best for long term solution because sell pressure will be handled more frequent preventing price drop too much
Just a comment about the usability of FEI as collateral: The burn penalty only exists if your exchange is an incentivized address like the FEI/ETH uniswap pool. It is part of the design of the protocol you can have non-incentivized addresses where you can trade without the burning fee.
Good catch, I didn’t think of that. so essentially t = m*100/r, and if we set r to m squared, that will mean t = m * 100/m^2 = 100/m, and that will have the desired effect of reducing time t when m is high.
I have tried to repeat the route ETH → FEI+ Buy Reward → TRIBE → ETH so that the price of FEI is pegged to 1$, but at the moment this route seems to be difficult to repeat as the profit is negative.
If there is such an arbitrage route, there is a possibility that the price will be pegged to 1$ faster.
However, as this seems to be difficult at the moment, I think that a faster method of reweighting would be better.
agree option 4 & 5 …
Capping the burn sounds fair at the first glance. There are a lot of people feeling trapped by FEI because of the massive burn. This gives a much less painful way out. This will lead to much more artibtrage as well, because now you can buy FEI with 14% mint reward, and selling with 2%-5% burn would still mean a profit. The arb will move the FEI price much closer to peg and also relieve a lot of selling pressure. This also means the liquidations in terms of borrow/lending protocols aren’t prohibitively painful. It actually means that FEI is a lot more liquid below the peg.
Although on second thought, this could be a very dangerous idea. If burn is capped at 2%, does it mean that reward will also be capped at 2%? If so, that means if FEI is ever very much off the peg, there will be little incentive to move it back up. If reward is un-capped but burn is capped, then that means a net FEI creation (because mint > burn), and an arbitrageur can buy with mint incentive and sell immediately with capped burn, and that actually creates downward price pressure because more FEI is sold than bought due to the extra minting, so this will create the opposite effect and move price further away from peg.
there needs to be Fei staking pools/incentives/collabs with other protocols so that price stability can maintain peg to 1$. Staking Fei for Tribe of on Fei, Curve, BNT**(IL protected pools), RGT (fuse pools) ,Pickle, Sushi, Harvest, ALCX, Cream. By enabling access to Fei stable coin (and Tribe later on) on these protocols there will free up the sell pressure on Fei and allow the reweights to take their natural course.
people need confidence to maintain the long-term stability of Fei.No matter which option is chosen, investors need to be given short-term confidence.
REMOVE the buy incentives, this just encourages people to buy cheap FEI and dump every time it rises a couple of cents and repeat the process over and over. Marketcap is huge so need need to incentivise buying under the peg ATM.