Designate Fei Rari Fuse Pool 8 a special High Maturity Market under the framework created by FIP-13 and FIP-39
immediately mandate OA to inject 25M $FEI into the pool
explicitly allow OA to deploy up to $150M FEI into the pool using the framework of FIP-39.
Motivation
FIP-13 and FIP-39 were created to allow for more efficient iteration on deployment of protocol owned FEI into lending markets. It explicitly allows Optimistic Approval (OA) to deploy 25M-50M $FEI into “High Maturity” markets such as Compound and Aave.
Fei Rari Fuse Pool 8 has matured significantly since the time of these FIPs passing. It will presumably continue to grow in utility, demand, and overall maturity as further assets are added to the pool and the pool plays a more and more central role to the Fei ecosystem. Thus far 20M protocol owned FEI has been deployed into this pool (10M through initial seeding, then another 10M by OA on October 16th ‘21). The protocol earned 465k FEI of interest so far in the pool. This proposal seeks to explicitly classify this pool as being mature and provide a framework for handling future growth of the pool.
Specification
If this proposal passes, OA’s will 1) deploy $25M to Fei Rari Fuse Pool 8 and 2) deploy additional funds to Fei Rari Fuse Pool 8 under the rules specified by FIP-39, up to 150M $FEI.
Voting Options
YES, update OA mandate
NO, leave mandate unchanged
Voting Rules
This proposal requires no on chain actions, so this is a binding snapshot vote. If passed, OA will enact the charter specified above.
it would be good to vote on this soon to match the high FEI demand in the pool. this demand will likely grow larger with all of the new collateral assets being allowed later today
I can understand where you’re coming from and in view of the merger this ad hoc solution might be optimal, but at the same time I can’t but reiterate that a financial institution of this scale is in dire need of more rigorous frameworks and tools to back up and steer such decisions, e.g.: methods of determining market maturity level.
And there should be a governance body with an oversight mandate for this kind of activity, akin to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the Fed Reserve system, something I’ve written about briefly in my informal suggestion on discord.
I think it’s a good idea. Clears out the confusion around OA mandate, and it gives us a good framework to face upcoming changes to the Fuse pool - we recently whitelisted a bunch of new collaterals in the FeiRari, most of which are directly incentivized by TRIBE rewards :
Up to 100M$ FEI-3crv LP tokens [250 AP rewards]
Up to 100M$ 3pool LP tokens [250 AP rewards]
Up to 100M$ of stETH
Up to 100M$ of G-UNI FEI-USDC 0.01% fee tier LP tokens [500 AP rewards]
Up to 25M$ of G-UNI FEI-DAI 0.05% fee tier LP tokens [100 AP rewards]
If all these caps are reached (I think they will, thanks to incentives), that’s more than 400M$ of additional collateral looking for something to borrow. The initial 25M seems mandatory (borrow rates are already high), and the snapshot will give the flexibility for more later, if needed.
Hopefully 3rd parties will also deposit FEI, and OA won’t need to use all the 150M limit.
because as for the body, clearly this kind of activity should be curated by a subDAO body, something akin to TF run with a decision making mechanism I described here
and as for the tools I described one of the kind here:
it’s a first step, but it’s not an aspiration, it can be already in the pipeline
This looks like a great idea. The $25m injection certainly seems mandatory given the current rates. The increase in supply caps also should encourage a lot of borrowing demand so an idle $150m ready to deploy seems like a great buffer. Ideally 3rd parties deposit Fei to capture some of this yield and the DAO doesn’t need to deploy much of this capital but the flexibility to do so should encourage adoption of the pool.
I wholeheartedly agree with the contents of the proposal, and a snapshot will unequivocally resolve any potential governance issues from these actions.
Given the market cap of the collateral assets, I would argue that point 3 can be modified to allow up to $200M even, though that is not the most important consideration here.
I agree with Pavel here. We really need to start doing some serious modeling before we make decisions like this. Gut feeling decisions with eye ball logic are dangerous.
