Hey devchain,
I think you misunderstood the most recent announcement. The team will be voting in favor of the proposal as soon as it goes live on Wednesday, April 21 at 4pm PT.
This “reduce sell pressure” meme from the core team is idiotic. You talk long term but now twice in a row the FIPs are expressly 100% short term.
If the goal is something like the “undo button” where it’s limited to folks who regret their Genesis decision, then it would makes sense. Otherwise you’re creating a free arb for bots who will drain the 300k in 24h or less and have zero impact on sell pressure in a month or whenever you get around to doing the other fixes.
But you’re not doing “undo button” where the faucet is limited to Genesis wallets and amounts.
Why is the team consistently ignoring this proposal that’s been around for so long now? Seems highly likely to me there’s someone in the background (maybe an investor who wants out now but didn’t buy at Genesis?) that’s stopping the team from embracing the undo button proposal.
VOTE NO!
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相比于这个提案我想我想到一个更加有利于各方的提案，同时对项目整体运作也会更加有利。
当价格低于0.95是协议主动动用pcv池子中的eth分批次去uni交易池回购fei，同时当回购价格低于0.95时将回购到的超额的fei（当成交价低于0.95时同样的eth回购买到更多的fei）中的一部分空投的tribe持有人鼓励他们去做lp池，而不是强迫他们去购买fei进lp池。
我认为我的这个提案，相交于原本的提案，只是让短期套利者赚走差价，这个提案把当价格低于0.95时产生的价差收益进入pcv池同时又照顾了tribe持有人的利益，更加有利于项目的长期发展。
Compared with this proposal, I think I can think of a proposal that is more beneficial to all parties and the overall operation of the project.
When the price is lower than 0.95, the agreement actively uses eth in PCV pool to buy back Fei in uni trading pool in batches. At the same time, when the repurchase price is lower than 0.95, some of the excess Fei (as the same eth buy back to buy more Fei when the transaction price is lower than 0.95) are airdropped. Some tribe holders encourage them to do LP pool instead of forcing them to buy Fei into LP pool.
In my opinion, my proposal intersects with the original proposal, and only allows short-term arbitragers to earn the price difference. This proposal puts the price difference income generated when the price is lower than 0.95 into the PCV pool, and at the same time takes care of the interests of tribe holders, which is more conducive to the long-term development of the project.
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I think it’s a good proposal and will vote yes. Below are some of my thoughts.
1. The proposal benefits 100% pre-swappers, too.
There is a concern that 100% pre-swappers will not benefit from the doubled staking bonus. I disagree. The doubled bonus will increase the demand for TRIBE because more people will want to stake FEI-TRIBE. This will put an upward pressure on the price of TRIBE. All TRIBE holders benefit from this higher price whether they stake or not.
Of course, if a TRIBE holder chooses not to stake and simply holds TRIBE, his benefit will be gone after two years. But if FIP-2 increases the price of TRIBE, he can trade a portion of his TRIBE for FEI and stake, without reducing the dollar value of TRIBE that he holds.
2. I encourage the team to make as much progress on cadenced reweights before we implement FIP-2.
Assuming FIP-2 passes, how much FEI gets redeemed at 0.95 depends on users’ confidence in the peg mechanism. If people expect cadenced reweights to be turned on in the near future, many will hold FEI rather than sell at a 5% discount. This will help preserve the PCV.
Some numbers: if the FIP-2 passes, the market price of FEI will increase to 0.95, and user circulating FEI, currently at 760m, will increase to around 860m. At an ETH price of 2000, the protocol will be able to redeem 600m out of those 860m. Whether this is enough depends on how close we are to pegging FEI when redemption takes place.
As a final note, I am not sure why DI is still a priority. We need more time to identify its benefits before we turn it back on. But I suppose we can discuss this after we observe how cadenced reweights work.
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For 100% preswap with airdrop effective cost per Tribe is $2.63
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There will be a limit of 300K Eth. After that, the normal mechanism will take over. So, theoretically you should be able to sell at $1 if the peg holds after the initial redemption.
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Why those who didn’t do preswap but just got stablecoins and the bonus should be in the same boat with those who did 100% preswap? If you did 100% preswap, then you took on trading risks and you had the opportunity to make a lot of money. Now you’re talking about justice. PCV should help the FEI to reach the peg. Therefore, everything is absolutely fair.
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I don’t understand your calculation from 760m to 860m FEI… I guess FEI in circulation will
- decline by the amount sold by exiters at @0.95
- increase by the amount bought by newcomers for staking mainly
Having said that I agree that in aggregate PCV collateral ratio will increase because of 0.05 discount hence Tribe price will .
And borrow FEI at ~6% to stake, negating the benefits of staking. Terrible idea.
I was trying to describe how much circulating FEI we would have in the instant before 0.95 redemption starts. Right now we have 760m, but the price is 0.82. Once the proposal passes, people will buy FEI from the PCV until the price reaches 0.95. So when the redemption starts, there will be more FEI circulating compared to the current amount (roughly 100m more).
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So you assume, before exit option @0.95 starts, FEI price will reach 0.95 with new purchases roughy 100m unit at which level negligible number of FEI holders will use that option.
Why do you arrange a discussion of the vote if you have already decided the outcome of the vote and the opinion of the community does not matter?
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Where is the rari? I searched and found only rarible.com Is that the right one?
We’re not talking about justice, we’re talking about PCV and gutting the PCV and giving it away to arbitragers. That 300k ETH will not be gone in 24 hours, it’ll be gone in 1 or 2 transactions. Those holding TRIBE, and yes the 100% pre-swappers, know that the ONLY hope for fixing this project is to preserve the PCV. Allow it to be arbitraged away and TRIBE holders AND REMAINING FEI holders will have tokens backed by NOTHING with no working mechanism for re-peg.
It seems that there is a lot of concern from the community about arbitrage and front-running by bots. While arbitrage is one required party that makes FEI work, can the team seriously look into mitigating this risk?
This is not about reinventing the wheel - a simple google search already yields some discussion about trying to prevent front running.
https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/known_attacks/
Well, if we don’t have a reweight mechanism by then, many FEI holders may choose to exercise the option. After all, the price reached 0.95 only because of the one-time option. The amount of exit really depends on whether people think FEI will peg to 1 soon enough.
It’s this website here: https://app.rari.capital/fuse/pool/8
Keep in mind that staking on rari will be pretty gas intensive and expensive at the moment, due to inflated gas prices.
Which means the amount of sale @0.95 will decrease FEI circulation and increase PVC ratio ( Tribe price)…
Agree. All the exit fei under $1 will bring benefit to the tribe holder. The scale decrease but the liquid increase.
Hold everything and not allow the fei exit, now you just got the worse result.
This proposal would leave the protocol in a phenomenal position having around 500m in PCV and a much tighter range in which the peg mechanics can operate. This is sort of like direct incentives of 5% burn on all selling to have a clean and simple way to restore the peg. Moving this much ETH around should be done as simply and securely as possible.
This faucet can have a dynamic exchange rate based on the collateralization ratio in the future as well! Would be an awesome way to incorporate @Eswak’s collateralization ratio oracle Feature : Collateralization oracle by eswak · Pull Request #94 · fei-protocol/fei-protocol-core · GitHub
The additional staking rewards incentivize more FEI to stay in the system and stake. It also incentivizes more holders of both FEI and TRIBE for alignment. TRIBE on TRIBE staking would not particularly benefit the system overall but it would increase the relative ownership percentage of the stakers. The primary driver again for the staking decision is simplicity as this is only one extra command in the proposal to allocate to the existing staking rewards contract, with no additional code needed.
We have code ready for the FEI redemption here: FIP-2 by Joeysantoro · Pull Request #95 · fei-protocol/fei-protocol-core · GitHub and can adjust the parameters for the FEI redemption price and the frequency and size of ETH batches into the ReserveStabilizer.
A critical point is that to restore the FEI peg either through reweights or redemptions it requires PCV to spend. We have code under review for fixed cadence reweights, which we hope to enable shortly after this proposal if it passes. We considered moving straight to cadenced reweights, but feel it will be better for reweights to come in with/after a price floor is established to minimize the amount of bot extractable value and wild swings in price.
An alternative is we could try to combine the reweights with the $.95 redemption to minimize PCV loss as you mention.
I’m open to lowering the amount of ETH allocated and including reweights in this single proposal.
@Eswak @fei.saver would love your thoughts on the above
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