You know, an interesting thing that the DAO could do is run temporary experiments with different mechanisms for stability. We could set aside $5M or $10M or $25M in collateral and deploy a temporary stable coin to the market backed by that collateral (not necessarily 100% backed either). Let it run on the market for a couple months to gather data and then implement those parameters into FEI if desired (and recall the tempcoins).
I understand your concern and I share it.
What Iām about to say is evidently biased because Iām a tribe holder. And from what you just said I assume youāre either staking LP tokens or holding tribe. Sorry if this assumption is wrong.
Right now, people that are desperate to sell their fei are counting on people like you and I to become afraid that our investment is threatened if theyāre not allowed to sell at a very small loss. After all, tribe holders are going to be the ones that vote on whether we create a price floor or derisk the pcv. So they need our sympathy and concern.
Or do they? There is, after all, an automated market maker to trade fei for tribe. One way to release sell pressure would be for fei holders to buy tribe. They evidently recognize tribeās value. Governance will determine the feit of fei. And once they have tribe they no longer need you and I to be afraid of losing our investment. Much less will they need to resort to vitriol against the team. Theyāll have a forceful voice in their vote.
Whatās more, the market dynamics as buy pressure increases for tribe might allow many of them to return to eth in the process.
I know what Iām saying seems like a joke. And Iām open to learning that itās indeed a terrible idea. But Iām throwing it out here so that it can be subjected to the forumās skepticism.
No, it makes sense to me. And I am an LP staker right now, so far so good ;).
I was never supporting the derisking, and I think a lot of noise is indeed made by ppl who did note read, or had very little understanding of the direct incentive mechanism.
I am more concerned by what I read from supporters of the protocol, and their propositions on tweaking the mechanism, because I think a lot of it looks in the range of āinteresting to damn rightā, but all those are post mortem and they are just adjustments, perfectly fine, and I think, acceptable in your logic (?) as in mine - and thatās really my point (Iām sure I am not that clear, but trying), how do we keep going this experiment?
And maybe youāre right, everything about the transitional pegged mechanism canāt actually be implemented without screwing it all. I honestly have to give it more thought. But you made me realize how naive the way I put it is.
And I appreciate you call it out, because this is most certainly naive.
Let see, and we might have other opportunities to discuss it. I need more time to come up with a more nuanced thinking on this.
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Iām all for tweaking! Thatās what governance is here for. Thereās no way that any engineer could have anticipated all the difficult socioeconomic dynamics that have arisen since Saturday. We will need to make a few decisions soon. And hopefully theyāll be the first of many to come in the next couple of years.
I do think in the long term itāll be good to have a diversified portfolio of PCV. Among it, some stable coins for disaster insurance will be a great idea. Although Iāll likely only vote on incorporating stable coins that are decentralized.
Thank you for having this conversation! I think whatever contribution we can make to improving the tone of the conversations in this forum is sorely needed. 
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Interesting idea there 
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We could even keep a large portion of the reserves in ETH with diversification into RAI or others as well
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I do think this is a good idea, though I hope we are able to make FEI stand on itās own without relying on other stablecoins. Maybe mix the PCV with not just ETH but BTC, renBTC, or WBTC? (gold backed). Or even Algorand or ADA.
Iād prefer that FEI be backed by value, and not just stability.